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ABSTRACT 
 
THE NETWORK STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE INNOVATION 
Devon Brackbill 
Damon Centola 
Prior research on how to design collaboration networks among scientists, engineers, and 
strategists surprisingly predicts that inefficient networks that slow down the rate of collaboration 
will lead to better performance on complex problems. However, empirical research has provided 
mixed evidence for these ideas. Here, we test this theory using an online Data Science 
Competition that experimentally manipulates the network efficiency of teams working on a 
complex problem. The results support the idea that less efficient collaboration networks increase 
collective performance on complex problems. The results have important implications for 
designing problem-solving teams in numerous domains. 
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PREFACE 
Do efficient communication networks increase collective intelligence? Scientists, 
engineers, and strategists all work within highly connected environments where each person’s 
solutions are used to inspire and inform the work of others. The communication networks 
between researchers can determine the rate at which new ideas and innovations reach the rest of 
the community, giving rise to better solutions to difficult problems. As the complexity of the 
problem increases, so does the putative need for more efficient collaboration networks. Firms, 
research organizations, and universities have all invested in developing network technology to 
improve communications between researchers trying to solve complex problems. However, 
recent theoretical evidence suggests that these efforts may be counterproductive. These theories 
suggest that when teams are solving the most complex problems, increasing network efficiency 
can actually reduce the overall progress of members of communication networks. 
Current empirical studies testing these theories have provided mixed support, with one initial 
study providing supportive evidence, and a second larger study providing contrary evidence. 
These studies have relied upon simplified games that are meant to capture the central elements 
of group problem-solving, and they have recruited subjects using convenience samples, such as 
Amazon Mechanical Turk or undergraduate populations. 
In order to address some of the concerns about external validity with previous research 
on this topic, this dissertation draws on research using “computational social science,” where the 
goal is to capture real world behavior while also maintaining precise causal control (Centola, 
2010; Lazer et al., 2009; Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006; van de Rijt, Kang, Restivo, & Patil, 
2014). This dissertation tests these theories by gathering original data from an Internet-based 
experiment called the Annenberg Data Science Competition 
(https://www.datascience.upenn.edu). In order to recruit the subjects who solve these complex 
problems in the real world – statisticians and data scientists – I decided to build an online platform 
so that individuals could participate through their web browser from any computer with an Internet 
connection. I invited statisticians from across the country to solve complex statistical problems on 
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teams, and exogenously manipulated their collaboration network to see how it affected their 
ability to solve complex problems. The Annenberg Data Science Competition was modeled after 
crowd-sourced data science competitions, such as the Netflix Prize, the KDD Cup Challenge, and 
Kaggle.com, where data scientists from around the world compete to build the most accurate 
forecasting models from a data set. 
By building a platform that attracts the people in the real world who normally solve such 
complex problems and by situating them in a realistic environment, this design allows me to 
capture the actual problem-solving behavior of individuals working on highly complex problems. 
Additionally, the experimental design allows me to causally identify the effect of network efficiency 
on collective performance. 
The results support the idea that less efficient collaboration networks increase collective 
intelligence on complex problems. These results have important implications for the design of 
teams that are working on complex problems in design, engineering, and science. 
The dissertation consists of two sections. Chapter 1 (“The Network Structure of Collective 
Innovation: An Experimental Study”) is a concise presentation of the project for a general science 
audience who is interested in network theory and collective intelligence. It presents the main 
findings from the experiment, and defers further discussion of Design of the Experimental Study 
and Robustness Analyses to the end of this section. Chapter 2 (“Applications of Network 
Engineering to Team Problem-Solving”) reports the results for a more specialized audience in 
management, business, and organizational theory who would be interested in finding practical 
ways to make use of the study’s findings. I first present the original model, and then show 
experimental results supporting that model. Then, I revise the model with novel simulations to 
show that collaborative efficiency can be changed in other ways beyond rewiring networks, as the 
original theory presupposed. I conclude by discussing practical ways to slow down collaboration 
among problem-solving teams using the theoretical results from this section. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE NETWORK STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE INNOVATION: 
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
Abstract 
Prior research on how to design collaboration networks among scientists, engineers, and 
strategists surprisingly predicts that inefficient networks that slow down the rate of collaboration 
will lead to better performance on complex problems. However, empirical research has provided 
mixed evidence for these ideas. Here, we test this theory using an online Data Science 
Competition that experimentally manipulates the network efficiency of teams working on a 
complex problem. The results support the idea that less efficient collaboration networks increase 
collective performance on complex problems. The results have important implications for 
designing problem-solving teams in numerous domains. 
Introduction 
Do efficient communication networks increase the rate of innovation? In many complex problems, 
researchers, engineers, scientists, and designers face a tradeoff between exploring new 
possibilities by creating new solutions, or exploiting existing solutions by collaborating with others 
(Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006; March, 1991). Theories from diffusion research suggest that 
when teams work to solve problems, more efficient collaboration networks would improve 
performance (Rogers, 2003; Strang & Soule, 1998). Such efficient networks would rapidly 
disseminate the most novel and high-quality solutions, which would improve group performance. 
However, recent theoretical work has indicated that excessive connectivity can undermine 
collective performance on complex problems (Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010; Lazer & Friedman, 
2007). These theories predict that inefficient networks promote collective innovation by preserving 
the group’s solution diversity, which prevents them from prematurely adopting a suboptimal 
solution. As a result, embedding teams in inefficient collaboration networks allows them to more 
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effectively navigate the large non-convex solution spaces that characterize many important 
problems in technology, science, and public policy (Kauffman, Lobo, & Macready, 2000; 
Kauffman & Macready, 1995; Lazer & Friedman, 2007).  
Despite the importance of understanding how to build teams to solve complex problems, 
existing empirical tests have not been able to consistently support one hypothesis over the other. 
An initial empirical study supported the idea that inefficient collaboration would increase collective 
performance (Mason, Jones, & Goldstone, 2008), but a second larger experiment found the 
opposite (Mason & Watts, 2012). Both studies involved recruiting convenience samples to 
participate in a stylized online game that had some similarities to real-world complex problems. 
Here, we provide novel evidence to address the empirical disagreement by examining how 
collaboration affects domain experts in a real-world complex problem. 
Methods 
To test the hypothesis that network efficiency decreases collective performance, we conducted a 
controlled experiment. Using a web-based platform, we recruited statisticians and data scientists 
from the World Wide Web to participate in a Data Science Competition (see Design of the 
Experimental Study). Individuals were given a regression problem where they needed to find the 
best predictive model, such as predicting the sales volume for a popular retailer. Subjects 
interacted with these data sets using a custom-built platform via their web browser that displayed 
their model performance on each round and allowed them to adjust their model. Models were 
scored based on a predictive accuracy metric (see Design of the Experimental Study). 
The competition lasted for 15 rounds, where each round required individuals to make a 
decision to either explore a new solution or exploit a neighbor’s solution. Exploration meant 
deciding to change their solution by adding or removing a single variable from their statistical 
model, which was meant to capture how individuals incrementally search from their current 
solutions (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Stuart & Podolny, 1996) (see Design of the Experimental Study). In contrast, exploitation meant 
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copying an existing solution from one of their network neighbors. To copy a better solution, 
individuals saw the performance scores of their best network neighbors, and could choose to 
adopt a better solution. Additionally, individuals could maintain their current solution. 
Once a participant submitted a decision for the round, they received immediate feedback on the 
performance of their new solution. If the solution was better, they adopted it, and proceeded to 
the next round, and if the solution was worse, they were returned to their previous solution. Each 
round lasted for 1 minute. Individuals never knew if they had the best possible solution, and they 
were incentivized to find better solutions each round, and received financial rewards based on the 
quality of their final solution. 
 Individuals solved a complex combinatorial optimization problem that shares essential 
features with complex problems in design, engineering, and complex problem-solving (Kauffman, 
1993, 1995; Kauffman et al., 2000; Kauffman & Macready, 1995). Each solution was represented 
as a sequence of decisions to either include or exclude a variable in a statistical model. Each 
decision affected the overall fitness of the entire solution, and the problems were sufficiently 
complex so that there was a high degree of interdependency among the components of the 
solution (see Design of the Experimental Study), which is a hallmark of complex problems 
(Kauffman, 1993). This complex interdependency gave rise to solution “fitness landscapes” where 
teams could get caught on many locally optimal solutions (Kauffman, 1993; Wright, 1932). To 
ensure that our findings were general across numerous data science problems, we used several 
different problems across the experimental trials (see Design of the Experimental Study). 
 Participants in the study were randomly assigned to one of two collaboration network 
conditions – an efficient network with minimum possible average path length (L = 1), which was a 
fully connected network, or an inefficient network with higher average path length (L = 1.67 for N 
= 10, and L = 2.89 for N = 20), which was a ring lattice with average degree Z=4 (Fig. 1). To 
make each group in a trial as similar as possible, each participant was given a random starting 
solution that was matched with someone in the other condition (see Design of the Experimental 
Study). This allowed us to see how differences in network structure could affect two initially 
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similar populations. The design resulted in 14 independent networks, and seven matched pair 
trials. Population sizes were fixed within a given trial, and we ran six pairs with N=10 subjects in 
each network, and one pair with N = 20 subjects, comprising 160 participants in the study. 
Subjects were recruited based on their statistical ability (see Design of the Experimental Study). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Structure of the experiment. All experimental trials consisted of two networks, one 
efficient (L = 1), and one inefficient (L=1.67 or 2.89). In each of the seven trials, subjects were 
randomly assigned to one network condition, and then randomly assigned to a single node in the 
network. On the initial round of each trial, subjects received a random starting solution. On 
subsequent rounds, subjects saw the performance of their immediate network contacts and could 
copy these solutions. In a single trial, random initial solutions were matched across conditions, 
and groups faced the same data science problem. 
 
 Participants in the study were shown an identical user interface in both experimental 
conditions. Features of the social network, such as the average path length and the size of the 
population, were unobservable to participants (see Design of the Experimental Study). More 
generally, every aspect of the participants’ experience was equivalent across experimental 
conditions. The only difference was the structure of the social networks. Thus, any differences in 
collective performance may be attributed to the effects of network efficiency on the process of 
collective innovation (see Design of the Experimental Study). 
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Results 
The results show that the efficiency of the collaboration network had a significant effect on the 
quality of collective innovation. We find that inefficient networks discovered better solutions than 
efficient networks (P = 0.02, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This effect was consistent across each 
of the seven trials (Fig. 2). On average, inefficient networks found solutions that were 21% better 
than those discovered by efficient networks. 
 
Fig. 2. Inefficient networks found better solutions than efficient networks. The maximum 
solution found by an individual in efficient (light) and inefficient (dark) networks is plotted across 
all seven trials. The performance of each solution is scaled based on the best possible solution 
on a given data set (=1) compared to the group’s average starting performance (=0). 
 
Initially, all inefficient networks had worse average solutions than their efficient network 
pairs, and on average their mean solutions were 30% worse than efficient networks (P < 0.05, 
Wilcoxon signed-rank). However, as the theory predicts (Lazer & Friedman, 2007), this 
suboptimal performance did not persist throughout the experiment (Fig. 3). By round 14, 
inefficient networks had significantly reversed the trend and were generating better average 
solutions than efficient networks (P < 0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank). By the study’s conclusion, 
every inefficient network had a better mean solution than its efficient network pair. On average, 
efficient networks generated mean solutions that were 17% higher than efficient networks on the 
final round (P = 0.02, Wilcoxon signed-rank).  
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Fig. 3. Average performance in efficient and inefficient networks across time. Lines 
represent the average performance across all seven trials for efficient (light) and inefficient (dark) 
networks. Average performance was initially higher within efficient networks as compared to 
inefficient networks. However, by the study’s conclusion inefficient networks had a better average 
performance than efficient networks within each trial. 
 
 The performance of inefficient networks was heavily influenced by the speed of solution 
diffusion, both depressing the initial average performance, but also preserving diversity and 
allowing for better solutions to arise. Diffusion rates were significantly lower in inefficient networks 
than in efficient networks (P < 0.01, Wilcoxon rank sum test). When the top solution was found in 
efficient networks, 76% of individuals adopted it on the following round on average (Fig. 4). In 
contrast, only 32% of individuals adopted the best solution on the next round after its discovery in 
an inefficient network.  
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Fig. 4. Rate of solution diffusion. Proportion of individuals adopting the best solution after it 
was found at t=0 over the following 5 rounds. Efficient networks took on average 5 rounds to 
diffuse the solution to the entire population. In contrast, inefficient networks did not see universal 
diffusion of the solution on average across all trials in the observation window of the study. The 
figure shows the mean fraction who adopt a group’s best solution across seven trials. 
 
 The lower rate of solution diffusion in inefficient networks led to a greater diversity of 
solutions in these networks (Fig. 5). Inefficient networks discovered a larger portion of the solution 
space, on average successfully adopting 36% more distinct solutions across all time compared to 
efficient networks (P = 0.03, Wilcoxon signed rank test). Additionally, inefficient networks were 
significantly less likely to herd onto the most popular solution on each round (P < 0.05, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, for rounds 1 through 14) (Fig. 6). By maintaining more solution diversity, 
inefficient networks had a higher likelihood that additional explorations would find better solutions. 
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Fig. 5. Diversity of solutions. The cumulative number of distinct solutions discovered in efficient 
(light) and inefficient (dark) networks throughout time. 
 
Fig. 6. Fraction adopting most popular solution. The average fraction of the population who 
adopt the most popular solution on each round is plotted across 15 rounds. There were fewer 
cases of duplicated solutions in inefficient (dark) than in efficient (light) networks. 
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Discussion 
As with all experiments, design choices that aided the control of the study also put 
constraints on the behaviors that we could test. A limitation of the design is that the subjects were 
experts in statistics who received a single complex problem and had to solve it in a limited time. 
However, increasing the length of time would make no difference for the results because 
individuals in efficient networks converged on a single solution and were unable to move to a 
better solution even with more time. Many real world complex problems have a similar high level 
of interdependency where individuals can get stuck on local optima, including problems in 
engineering, technology, and public policy (Kauffman et al., 2000; Kauffman & Macready, 1995). 
Additionally, the experts used in this study have many similarities with problem-solvers in other 
real-world domains, including in terms of their experience, approaches to collaboration, and 
search strategies. While the design restricted individuals to incremental search, research has 
shown that when faced with complex problems, animals, individuals, and organizations search 
incrementally and do not abandon solutions, so our design captures the essential elements of 
collective innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). Further, the results were similar when we allowed 
individuals to search in a non-incremental manner (see Robustness Analyses).  
 Additionally, this study focused on one aspect of collective problem-solving, namely 
solution discovery among problem-solvers working in parallel (Lazer & Friedman, 2007). There 
are many additional aspects to collective problem-solving, such as efforts to coordinate and 
motivate members of large teams. When the logistics of coordinating large groups is the most 
pressing issue, then efficient networks should be used because they are known to promote faster 
and more universal adoption of a norm or technological standard (Centola & Baronchelli, 2015). 
Many of the large gains in productivity that have resulted from investments in communication 
technology have helped organizations find better ways to coordinate their behavior. Consistent 
with theory, more efficient collaboration would allow groups to perform better on these simple 
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problems. However, the large gains that have resulted from increases in efficiency on these 
simple problems will be at odds with group performance when they face the most complex 
problems, as the findings from this study suggest. Engineers, designers, and scientists face both 
simple and complex problems, and as a result, organizations may need to find ways to flexibly 
change their network structures depending on the complexity of the problem they face (Shore, 
Bernstein, & Lazer, 2015). 
 In contrast to previous research, our results show no benefits to efficient networks over 
inefficient ones when groups face complex problems (Mason & Watts, 2012). Instead, our 
findings suggest that inefficient networks may be an important part of collective innovation on 
complex problems. This finding agrees with theoretical (Fang et al., 2010; Kim & Park, 2009; 
Lazer & Friedman, 2007) and empirical (Mason et al., 2008; Mason, 2014) research on complex 
problems that finds inefficient networks promote collective solution diversity, which in turn 
improves the best solution and the average group solution in the long run. Concerns about 
groupthink, production blocking, and the common knowledge effect appear to be well-found, and 
have the potential to prevent groups from finding the best solutions (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987, 1991; 
Janis, 1972, 1982). Surprisingly, finding ways to break ties, restrict information flow, and slow 
down collaboration may be an important way to increase the rate of discovery on the most 
complex problems. 
Supplementary 1: Design of the Experimental Study 
Experimental Design 
Each trial of the study consisted of a matched pair of networks, one efficient and one inefficient 
network. As subjects came into the study, they were randomized to one of the network conditions. 
The schema for this design is shown in Figure S1. Once subjects were randomized to a network 
condition, they were randomly assigned to one node in the network, and they maintained this 
position throughout the experiment. In each trial, both networks had the same size (either N=10 
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or N=20), but they differed in terms of their average path length. The networks also differed in 
terms of their degree, density, and diameter, but average path length is the central independent 
variable (Lazer & Friedman, 2007). Seven independent trials of the study were run. Across all 
seven trials, half of the subjects were randomly assigned to the efficient network condition and 
the remaining half were enrolled in the inefficient network condition. By holding all variables 
constant except network structure, we can identify how network efficiency affects collective 
problem-solving. 
 
 
Fig. S1. Schema of the experiment. Each subject is randomly assigned to a network condition, 
and then randomly assigned to a single node within the network. 
Subject Recruitment 
Participants in our study were recruited via online advertisements posted on the World Wide Web 
to participate in the “Annenberg Data Science Competition.” When subjects arrived to the study 
website, they registered to participate by completing a form that required them to submit their 
email address, and choose an avatar and a username. All participants were required to provide 
informed consent in order to complete the registration process. Advertisements were placed 
online and direct emails were sent to several thousand interested participants. This recruitment 
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campaign generated 1,182 unique registrations in the system. From this pool, we invited subjects 
back to participate in the competition on a specific date. By following a link that only became 
active shortly before the competition began, participants could access the online platform at the 
specified date and time. When participants arrived at a live competition, they viewed instructions 
on how the competition worked, and waited while other subjects arrived.  When a sufficient 
number of subjects arrived to conduct a single trial of the study (i.e. 20 individuals), all 20 
subjects were then randomized to experimental conditions as described above, at which point the 
trial would begin in both conditions. The study was run for a 113-day period, December 10, 2015 
through March 31, 2016 over which time online advertisements were posted to attract subjects to 
participate in the study. In total, 160 unique subjects were recruited to participate in the main 
study. Of the 160 individuals in the main study, 80 participated in inefficient networks, and 80 
participated in efficient networks. An additional 20 subjects were recruited for a robustness trial, 
which is reported below. 
Subject Pool 
Due to the complex nature of the problem, we recruited subjects who were specialists in 
statistics. We wanted individuals who actually work on these complex problems, so that we could 
capture the behavior of real world teams of problem-solvers. The subjects in the study were 
skilled in statistics and quantitative methods. In order to participate, subjects had to understand 
how to run a linear regression model, and how to interpret coefficients, p-values, and model 
performance. While subjects did receive an introductory video, this video only described how the 
platform interface worked, and it did not include instructions about statistics. As a result, subjects 
were informed that the competition would be demanding on their skills, and that they should only 
participate if they had the skills to understand the statistics problems used in the study. All 
recruitment efforts were directed toward forums where individuals with quantitative skills would 
visit. To assess the statistical skills of the sample, we provided a voluntary survey question that 
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asked how many statistics courses they had taken. Of the individuals who responded to this 
question, the participants took a mean of 3 (sd=3.6) college-level statistics courses. 
Subject Experience During the Experiment 
To isolate the causal effect of network structure, the interface in each condition was identical. 
Individuals began a trial with a randomized initial solution. Then, individuals decided whether they 
wanted to revise their current model by adding or removing a single variable, or copy a solution 
from one of their neighbors. For example, one data set required individuals to find the variables 
(such as age, pH, and acidity) that predict taste ratings for wines (Fig. S2). Subjects made the 
decision to explore or copy by clicking on a radio button on the right side of the interface that 
allowed them to select their own solution, or select another player’s solution (Fig. S2). The 
interface when subjects selected to revise their own solution is shown in Figure S2. Subjects 
could add or remove one variable by clicking the button with the variable’s name. When they had 
made their choice for the round, they had to press the red “Submit” button on the right side of the 
interface. When a better option was available to copy, subjects saw the interface in Figure S3, 
which included a pop-up to indicate the better model. To copy a neighbor’s model, individuals had 
to click on the radio button next to their model and then press the “Submit” button to end the 
round. The interface displayed the option to copy only when one of the individual’s neighbors had 
a better solution. On rounds where the individual had the best solution in their local 
neighborhood, the interface defaulted to showing the interface to explore their model in Figure 
S2. 
After submitting their decision to either copy or explore for the round, individuals received 
feedback based on the quality of their solution, and they waited while other players finished the 
round. When individuals found a better solution, they received a pop-up tracking their 
improvement as shown in Figure S4. When individuals tried a new solution, but it was not better 
than their previous solution, they received a notification that they would be returned to their 
previous solution as shown in Figure S5. If individuals decided to submit the same solution, they 
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received a notification indicating their choice as shown in Figure S6. Finally, if individuals made 
no choice before the timer ran out, they would remain at their previous model, and they received 
a notification as shown in Figure S7. 
This sequence was repeated for 15 rounds in total, and each round lasted for 1 minute. 
The entire experiment lasted 15 minutes with an additional instructional video prior to the 
competition. We registered every click on each round—either decisions to explore or copy—so 
we had complete records of individual decisions. To motivate subjects, rewards were based on 
the quality of their final solution with a maximum payout of $10. This design allowed us to 
examine the effect of network efficiency on the quality of group solutions. 
 
 
Fig. S2. Screenshot of the experimental interface when subjects explored their model. 
15 
 
 
Fig. S3. Screenshot of the experimental interface when a neighbor had a better solution. 
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Fig. S4. Screenshot of the experimental interface when a subject finished a round and 
adopted a better solution. 
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Fig. S5. Screenshot of the experimental interface when a subject finished a round and 
adopted a worse solution. 
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Fig. S6. Screenshot of the experimental interface when a subject finished a round and 
submitted the same solution. 
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Fig. S7. Screenshot of the experimental interface when a subject ran out of time on a round. 
 
Data Science Problems 
Each experimental trial involved a network of individuals who were invited to compete on a 
platform designed specifically to host a data science competition and to study this research 
question. Solutions were evaluated on each round based on the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) of their model, which provides continual feedback on their performance. The BIC is chosen 
because it is a good asymptotic measure of out-of-sample model performance and performs 
similarly to cross-validation predictive accuracy (Shao, 1997). The BIC rewards constructing 
sparse models that explain sufficient variance in the dependent variable. Individuals begin with a 
randomly assigned model and can explore from that point. 
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In order to ensure that the problem contains sufficient complexity, we used a method of creating 
data sets that draws directly on the NK model (Kauffman, 1993). The crucial feature of complex 
problems is that changing one dimension affects the fitness contribution from another dimension. 
Such synergies among the components produce many local maxima in the problem space so that 
incremental, local search can miss the global maximum. In contrast to , which will always 
improve with the addition of more variables, performance metrics such as BIC penalize variables 
that do not provide additional information. In a simple landscape, where variables do not interact, 
each predictor variable contributes statistically independent information that improves the quality 
of the model. When a variable explains no variance in the predictor variable, its contribution is 
clear because the BIC will decline. In contrast, in a complex landscape, there are correlations 
among the variables, which is common in real world data sets. Variables often contain redundant 
information that is already captured by another variables. As a result, adding redundant 
information to the model will result in a worse BIC score and worse out-of-sample performance 
because the model is effectively being fit to noise that is idiosyncratic to the training data set. 
To ensure that the data science problems in this study had this complex structure, we adopted 
existing data sets and increased the correlations among the variables. The procedure works by 
holding fixed the amount of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by all the 
predictor variables, but then shuffling that predictive variation among the predictor variables. By 
altering the correlation among the X’s, we can shift from a simple to a complex problem. In a 
complex problem, the contribution to the fitness of one variable depends on whether another 
variable is already included in the model or not. This interdependency among the components 
produces a complex fitness landscape. 
An example is shown in Figure S8. For example, imagine  and  are predictive of the 
dependent variable, , but both are correlated with each other. If  is already included in the 
model, the addition of  might result in a worse BIC, particularly if the portion of each variable 
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that is predictive of is shared among the two variables. However, if  had not previously been 
in the model, the addition of  might explain even more variation and result in a better BIC. In 
contrast, if  and  are independent, then their joint inclusion in a model will always improve 
the BIC (assuming both predict the dependent variable). When faced with a complex landscape 
with many correlated variables, as is common in many real world data problems, greedy 
optimization can result in settling on local peaks rather than finding the best model, which is a 
well-known problem for step-wise regression techniques (Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2001; 
Sribney, 2011). 
 
 
Fig. S8. Schema of simple (A) and complex (B) data science problems. Each circle 
represents the variance in a variable, X1 and X2. The gray components within each variable are 
the portions or each variable that are predictive of the dependent variable, Y. Panel A: In simple 
problems, the “fitness” of a predictor variable in terms of explaining the dependent variable 
depends only upon that variable. This means that each variable is independent of all other 
variables. Panel B: In complex problems, the “fitness” of a predictor variable depends upon the 
presence of other variables that are correlated with it. Even if X2 predicts the dependent variable, 
it will only improve the BIC score if it provides sufficient independent variation that is not 
accounted for by another variable in the model, X1. Even though the entire variation predicted by 
X1 and X2 is the same as the simple problem, the “fitness” of adding new variables depends 
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upon how much additional variance explained beyond what is already explained by the existing 
variables. The red box represents covariation between X1 and X2 that is predictive of the target 
variable. Because this information is redundant, adding X2 to the model might not improve it any 
further. If the unique variance explained by adding X2 is too small (gray box within X2), then the 
BIC model performance will actually get worse by the addition of X2. 
 
We applied this procedure to three data sets to generate complex data science problems. 
To ensure that the problems were sufficiently complex, we ran all linear regression models, and 
then counted the number of local optima in the solution space. A solution was a local optima 
when adding or removing any single variable would result in a worse solution. A simple problem 
should have one local optima, whereas a complex problem has several. The data problems were 
large and complex, with 2,048 to 16,384 possible solutions and 9 to 16 local optima, as shown in 
Table S1. 
Trial Data Set Variables Solutions Local Optima 
1 Wine 11 2,048 11 
2 Viral News 14 16,384 9 
3 Viral News 14 16,384 9 
4 Sales Forecast 14 16,384 16 
5 Sales Forecast 14 16,384 16 
6 Sales Forecast 14 16,384 16 
7 Sales Forecast 14 16,384 16 
Table S1. Descriptive statistics of the data problems used in the study. 
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Network Metrics 
 Average path length (or characteristic path length) is the mean geodesic or shortest path 
connecting two pairs of vertices (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). It is defined as the following for 
undirected graphs: 
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where Li is the average distance between node i and all other nodes; di,j is the shortest path 
connecting nodes i and j; and n is the population size. It is a measure of the efficiency with which 
information can flow through a network. Higher path lengths indicate less efficient communication 
networks, and lower path lengths indicate more efficient information spread. We use the 
undirected, unweighted version of this metric because of the experiment’s design. 
Data Analysis 
The performance of each model was measured in terms of its Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC), which is also known as the Schwarz Criterion (Schwarz, 1978). The BIC is a measure of a 
model’s out of sample performance on a new data set that it has not been trained on. The BIC is 
a function both of the likelihood function and a regularization term that penalizes the addition of 
more parameters. The BIC is defined as: 
)ln(ˆln2 nkLBIC 
 
where Lˆ is the maximum of the likelihood function of the model, k is the number of free 
parameters to be estimated, and n is the number of observations in the data set. In the case of a 
linear regression used in the experiment, k is the number of regressors including the intercept in 
the model. 
 To create a measure of group performance, we rescaled the BIC metric onto the range 
[0,1]. Since lower BIC indicates that a model is a better fit to the data, we created a measure of 
group top performance by transforming the BIC as follows: 
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where the numerator is the difference between group i’s average starting solution on the initial 
round (t=0) and the maximum solution on the current round t, and the denominator is the 
difference between the group’s average starting solution and the best possible solution. To 
capture average group performance, we use the following formula: 
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where the numerator is the difference between the group’s average solution at t=0 and the 
group’s average at time t, and the denominator is the same. Both metrics range from 0 (the 
group’s initial solution) to 1 (the best possible solution), and indicate how much groups have 
improved from their initial starting solution. The average initial starting solution was fixed between 
conditions within a given trial because we matched the same starting solutions between 
conditions, and the best possible solution was fixed for each data set. As a result, this metric is 
directly comparable between conditions so long as individuals started from the same solutions in 
both conditions and they used the same data problem. 
 To assess the performance of the best solution each group found, we compared Besti for 
each network structure in the seven trials using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. This test is a non-
parametric test for matched pairs comparing the probability that observations from one condition 
will be greater than those from another condition. In essence, it tests whether it is more likely than 
chance within each matched pair that one group will consistently have a larger value than the 
other. It is very similar to the paired t-test, but it provides a more conservative estimate of 
significance because it does not assume a normal distribution. We found that the null hypothesis 
that there was no difference in the top solution across conditions could be accepted with a 
probability of P = 0.02. All statistical tests used a two-sided test of significance. 
To examine the average performance of groups, we compared Averagei in each 
condition using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test after the initial round. We also conducted this test 
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on the final round. To construct aggregate statistics across all seven trials, we also averaged 
across all efficient and inefficient networks. 
To examine the rate of diffusion of top solutions, we counted the fraction of individuals 
who adopted the best solution on every round following its discovery. Because the experiment 
only lasted for 15 rounds, there is some missing data because groups may have found their top 
solution very close to the end of the experiment. 
To examine the difference in diversity between conditions, we compared the set of 
unique solutions that were adopted in all fifteen rounds using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. We 
tested differences between conditions using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. To quantify herding, 
we calculated the proportion of individuals who adopted the most popular solution on each round, 
and then calculated the average across the seven trials. We tested differences in the herding rate 
using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Subject Retention 
The experiment had a high retention rate, with 86% of all subjects completing the final round. 
There was no significant difference in retention rates across conditions, with 85% of subjects 
finishing the study in inefficient networks, and 87% finishing in efficient networks (P = 0.75, 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The most common reasons for attrition were due to network 
connectivity issues, where the platform would disconnect a user if they closed their browser tab. 
We used the data from an individual until they left the study, or completed the final round. 
Ensuring Data Quality 
 We took several precautions in order to ensure that subjects did not violate the design of 
the experiment. Such precautions can be more difficult in online experiments because 
researchers may have less control over the behavior of the subjects than in traditional laboratory 
settings. We took several steps to ensure that the data was sound. In order to prevent individuals 
from participating in the study multiple times, we designed the system so that if a user tried to use 
a second browser tab to simultaneously participate, the system would produce an error, and only 
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allow one active browser tab to communicate on the same computer. Additionally, we required 
users to enter their email address before playing the game, and all payments were sent to these 
addresses, which made it more difficult for users to gain access to the system multiple times. To 
do so, a user would have had to enroll with multiple email addresses. Even if users were able to 
bypass these measures, each trial of the study used a new data problem so that repeat users 
would not have any advantage over new players. The interface was explained with a video 
instruction as users waited for the game to start, so there was very little reason to believe that 
there was any skill or learning that could occur from having played the game before. 
Robustness Analysis 
Individual Rate of Exploration 
Previous research has hypothesized that the mechanism through which inefficient networks 
promote better solutions is that individuals are incentivized to explore more in inefficient networks 
(Mason & Watts, 2012). This increased exploration is expected to decrease the likelihood that the 
collective will converge on a premature suboptimal solution. Our results do not support this 
hypothesis (Fig. S9). Instead, network structure did not affect the rate of exploration between 
condition (P = 0.93, Wilcoxon signed rank test). The rate of individual exploration was measured 
as the number of times an individual made a revision to their model and pressed the “submit” 
button. 
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Fig. S9. Attempts to explore new solutions. The average fraction of plays that were attempts 
to explore are plotted for each network across all trials. Error bars are two standard errors of the 
mean.  
 
Population Scaling Effects 
To examine how the results scale to large populations, we conducted simulations with increasing 
population size. The simulations use a data science problem that was used in the experiment, 
and allow agents to interact for 15 rounds. We used the exact starting solutions that were used in 
the experiment for this data science problem. We then test the differences between fully 
connected networks (Efficient) and lattices where every node has degree = 4 (Inefficient) for 
population sizes n = 10, 100, and 1,000. The average path lengths in the inefficient network 
increase from L = 1.7, to 12.9, to 125.2. 
The results for the best solution scale to larger populations (Fig. S10). As population size 
increases, inefficient networks perform better because it is more likely that the exploration in 
inefficient networks will find a better top solution. In contrast, in efficient networks performance 
does not increase because early copying has locked in efficient networks on suboptimal 
solutions.  
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To examine how the results vary with different assumptions about how frequently 
individuals prefer to explore even when a better solution is available to copy, we then vary how 
often individuals make this “error.” The bottom row of Fig. S10 shows the results when individuals 
see a better solution, but choose to explore instead of copying 25% of the time, which was the 
rate of exploration observed from the empirical data. The results are very similar for inefficient 
networks. In contrast, for efficient networks, performance increases because the greater diversity 
that results from additional exploration helps prevent groups from getting stuck on a local 
optimum. This improvement from individual exploration is not sufficient to equal the performance 
of inefficient networks, which indicates that the effect of network structure on group performance 
in this experiment is larger than the effect of individual preferences to explore. 
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Fig. S10.  Scaling effects of the best solution with population size. Performance of the best 
solution is plotted for 3 population sizes (10, 100, and 1000) with two levels of error (0, and 0.25). 
An error of 0 indicates that when an agent sees a better solution, it fails to copy that solution 0% 
of the time, and 0.25 indicates a 25% failure to copy a better solution. An error of 0.25 is similar to 
the effects observed in the empirical data. 100 simulations for each point. Simulations were run 
on a single data science problem from the experiment for 15 rounds. 
 
 The average group performance is not affected by scaling to larger population sizes 
when individuals always copy the best solution (Fig. S11, top). However, when individuals have a 
25% preference to explore even when a better option exists to copy, the efficient network 
performs better in terms of its average (Fig. S11, bottom). At larger population sizes, the efficient 
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network is able to spread a good solution to more individuals in the population, thus lifting up the 
group’s average performance. 
 
 
Fig. S11. Scaling effects of the average (mean) solution with population size. Performance 
of the average solution is plotted for 3 population sizes (10, 100, and 1000) with two levels of 
error (0, and 0.25). An error of 0 indicates that when an agent sees a better solution, it fails to 
copy that solution 0% of the time; an error of 0.25 indicates the agent would fail to copy a better 
solution 25% of the time. 100 simulations for each point. Simulations were run on a single data 
science problem from the experiment for 15 rounds. 
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Robustness to Design Choices: Allowing Non-Incremental Search 
To examine the sensitivity of the results to design choices, we conducted a robustness 
experiment. Our original experiment allowed individuals to make a single revision each round 
(i.e., incremental search). We chose this design because we wanted to capture realistic search 
processes by individuals and organizations in high-risk situations, where there are strong 
incentives to add slowly to a solution that has received heavy investment (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; March, 1991; March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). In 
the robustness experiment, we permitted individuals to make as many changes to their model on 
each round before submitting their new solution and receiving feedback (i.e., non-incremental 
search). We ran a single trial, comparing an inefficient network to an efficient one. The results 
show that allowing individuals to search non-incrementally does not change the differences 
between conditions (Fig. S12). The inefficient network still performed better than the efficient 
network even when both were allowed to make non-incremental searches. 
 
Fig. S12. Robustness to allowing non-incremental search. The maximum solution found by 
an individual in an efficient (light) and inefficient (dark) network where subjects were allowed to 
make non-incremental searches on all rounds. The performance of each solution is scaled based 
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on the best possible solution on a given data set (=1) compared to the group’s average starting 
performance (=0). 
 
 At the individual level, individuals did attempt to explore more widely when given the 
option. Across all attempts to explore, 38% of attempts involved non-incremental search. 
However, a majority of these attempts were unsuccessful, and individuals were more successful 
when they explored incrementally. When incremental exploration was used, individuals 
successfully found a better solution 19.4% of the time, in contrast to a success rate of only 9.8% 
for attempts to change more than one element of their solution. This result confirms the intuition 
that incremental exploration is both preferred by individuals, and also represents a more 
reasonable choice because the quality of the solution will likely be more similar to the current 
solution, and will likely be better. 
Attempts to Reduce Within-Network Variability 
 Within a complex landscape like the ones used in this study, there is considerable 
variability in group performance throughout the search process. A decision by a single individual 
to revise one component of their solution can directly affect the diversity of the entire group and 
the direction that the group can explore. As a result, it is possible that the within-network variation 
might mask any between-network variability. 
We took several precautions to minimize the variation within each network. The 
experiment used a matched pair design, where each individual in the inefficient network was 
given the same starting solution as an individual in the efficient network. Additionally, we provided 
individuals with suggestive information about which solutions might be better. This information 
came in the form of added variable plots at the bottom of the interface, where individuals could 
see if adding another variable would likely improve or worsen their solution. This information 
allows search to be much more efficient than simple random changes to the solution string, which 
is how the theoretical model operationalizes search (Lazer & Friedman, 2007). Additionally, the 
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variable names were real, and had actual correlation with the dependent variable, so any 
intuitions that individuals had about the causal relationships would help them explore more 
effectively. These features are expected only to speed up the dynamics so that the differences 
between conditions become more quickly apparent. 
Individual preferences to explore even when a better solution is available could diminish 
the differences between the network conditions. At the extreme, if individuals always explore and 
never copy, there will be no difference between the efficient and inefficient collaboration 
structures. While this “failure to copy” is a function of individual preferences, designing an 
interface that clearly demarcates the options that a user faces can help decrease instances of 
failing to copy. We designed the system defaults in the interface so that the best choice on any 
given round was made immediately apparent to users via pop-up boxes and prompts so that 
decisions to explore their model or exploit an existing solution could be made efficiently without 
cognitive interference (Fig. S3). 
Power Analysis 
To examine the likelihood that the experiment would detect the effects of network efficiency on 
collective performance, we conducted numerous power tests using simulations. Traditional power 
analysis tests in individual-level experiments begin by specifying an assumption about the effect 
size of the experimental manipulation. This assumption is either based on past empirical studies 
in the same research topic, or from estimations and intuitions about the effect size from with 
related studies. This model of power analysis is not appropriate for collective-level experiments. 
Instead, we constructed agent-based simulations using the exact data science problems in the 
experiment to test if collective performance would emerge from different assumptions about 
individual-level behavior. 
 There are two individual-level parameters that affect the likelihood of detecting a 
difference between the network conditions at the collective level. First, individuals differ in terms 
of their willingness to explore even when a better solution exists. This “failure to copy” parameter 
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could affect the ability to detect network differences. At the extreme, if individuals always explore 
and never copy, there will be no difference between the efficient and inefficient collaboration 
networks. Second, individuals may differ in how skillful they are when they explore. Skill in 
exploration means that an individual is more likely than chance to choose a variable that will 
improve their model, either from intuition about what variables will be effective, or from an 
understanding of the statistical information presented to the user. If individuals are better than 
chance at exploring, then the timescale for the effects will be increased. 
 To measure the sensitivity of the results to these unknown parameters, we conducted 
agent-based simulations that varied the degree to which individuals “failed to copy.” In all of the 
simulations, we assumed that individuals were no better than chance when they explored, so 
these tests provided a conservative estimate of the timescales. The results reported here are for 
N=10, using the final data science problem, where agents begin on the exact starting locations 
used in the experiment. We ran 100 simulations for 15 rounds at each value of the Failure to 
Copy Rate. Similar results were found for all the other data science problems. 
The results show that as the rate of failing to copy increases, the differences between networks 
become smaller (Fig. S13). The effect is gradual, however, which indicates that for a large range 
of individual preferences to explore new solutions rather than exploit existing options we will be 
able to detect a significant difference between conditions. In the study, about 25% of individuals 
failed to copy the best solution in the efficient network on the round immediately following its 
discovery. Figure S13 indicates that even when individuals ignore better solutions 25% of the 
time, we can still expect the inefficient network to outperform the efficient network on a majority of 
the trials. This suggests that we have a high probability of observing the predicted effects in our 
empirical setting. 
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Fig. S13. Power tests for “failure to copy.” As rates of failing to copy increase, the ability of the 
experiment to detect differences between the network conditions diminishes. 
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CHAPTER 2: APPLICATIONS OF NETWORK ENGINEERING TO TEAM 
PROBLEM SOLVING 
Introduction 
Solving complex problems requires teams of researchers. Examples include physicians 
discovering a correct diagnosis and prescription (Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1957), 
pharmaceutical engineers refining drugs to slow cancer growth, software developers moving 
through cycles of design and testing to refine the efficiency of a new program (Graham & 
Sichelman, 2010), state governments crafting public policy based on information about past 
effectiveness (Walker, 1969), or financial analysts updating portfolio allocations based on 
previous performance (Pan, Altshuler, & Pentland, 2012). Successful performance on a complex 
problem depends crucially on a team achieving the correct balance between innovation and 
collaboration, or what the theoretical literature has called exploration and exploitation (Gupta et 
al., 2006; March, 1991). For each individual, the decision to pursue innovation, i.e., to 
independently explore the solution space, is risky and entails the costs of time and effort. 
However, it offers the potential rewards of discovery, where a new innovation could dramatically 
improve the group. Alternatively, individuals can choose to exploit the knowledge already existing 
in their networks. This strategy will not reveal any new solutions, but it could improve their relative 
performance on the problem and help spread known solutions to others. Individuals’ decisions to 
innovate or collaborate translate into group-level performance – either accelerating the process of 
collective discovery or hastening the diffusion of previous solutions.  
In order for an organization to survive, it must find a way to balance the tradeoff between 
innovation and collaboration (March, 1991). Numerous studies have suggested that an 
organization’s collaboration network can be used to balance the forces of innovation and 
collaboration (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Fang et al., 2010; Mihm, Loch, 
Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2010; K. D. Miller, Zhao, & Calantone, 2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; 
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Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 
2005, 2006; Taylor & Greve, 2006). In particular, theoretical findings suggest that well-designed 
research networks can improve the rate of scientific and technological discovery. However, 
existing empirical research provides conflicting evidence regarding what the ideal structure for 
collective problem-solving actually is. 
Research on diffusion provides one theory as to how to structure collaboration networks 
(Rogers, 2003; Strang & Soule, 1998). Fast and efficient communication networks have the 
potential to provide problem-solvers with the most recent information in their networks. A single 
breakthrough by one person will spread rapidly throughout the network, benefitting all. Studies on 
research and development networks have provided some evidence to support this view (Kim & 
Park, 2009). 
However, theoretical research has shown that excessive communication might inhibit 
collective problem-solving in the long run (Fang et al., 2010; Lazer & Friedman, 2007). If groups 
collaborate at the expense of searching, their information diversity declines. They will begin to 
focus on a sub-set of the solutions, ignoring other potentially beneficial options, which can lead to 
groupthink, production blocking, and the common knowledge effect (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987, 1991; 
Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985). Since diversity is crucial to group performance (Hong & 
Page, 2004; Page, 2007), slowing down collaboration might be better. In particular, decentralizing 
communication into separate sub-units, such as separating research and development teams 
from the central organization, has been shown to be beneficial (Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). 
Experimental studies that have attempted to test these theoretical ideas have provided 
mixed support because they relied on small, highly stylized networks and used subjects from 
convenience samples to solve simple problems that do not capture the richness of experts 
solving real-world complex problems (Mason et al., 2008; Mason & Watts, 2012; Roberts & 
Goldstone, 2006; Wisdom, Song, & Goldstone, 2013). Existing theoretical results about the 
network structure of collective innovation suggest that managers and policymakers should take 
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the profoundly counter-intuitive action of reducing the efficiency of their collaboration networks. In 
a highly competitive market, such drastic institutional redesign requires clear evidence of the 
effect of collaboration networks on important problems. The existing empirical literature does not 
provide such clear guidelines. This paper examines the thesis that network efficiency has an 
inverse relationship to problem complexity using an online experiment where individuals must 
solve a complex problem, and it then applies these insights to management and organizational 
design to provide practical strategies to adjust collaborative efficiency to maximize collective 
innovation. 
Due to the difficulty of separating the causal effects of network structure from individual 
characteristics (Shalizi & Thomas, 2011), this study uses a controlled experiment to manipulate a 
group’s collaboration network, which identifies the causal effect of network structure on collective 
problem-solving (Centola, 2010, 2011; Centola & Baronchelli, 2015). This design allows me to 
test how network efficiency affects the ability of groups to solve complex problems.  
To study this question, we examine the problem of statisticians and data scientists solving 
complex statistical problems. Participants are invited to a data science competition where they 
must solve a statistical problem by choosing which predictor variables among a large number of 
options should be included in a statistical model, and by collaborating with other competitors. In 
order to recruit the subjects who solve these complex problems in the real world, we built an 
online platform that participants could access through their web browser from any computer with 
an Internet connection. This design allows us to capture the real-world problem-solving behavior 
of individuals working on highly complex problems. This design builds on much research in 
computational social science that emphasizes precise causal control while also allowing 
generalizability in terms of the situation and the individuals performing the behavior (Centola, 
2010; Lazer et al., 2009; Salganik et al., 2006; van de Rijt et al., 2014). This study is an attempt to 
find the people in the real world who normally solve such complex problems and test theoretical 
ideas about network efficiency. 
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To do this, we built upon a movement around crowd-sourced data science, which is a 
well-established implementation of collective intelligence that frequently delivers on the promise 
that the crowd can beat the experts (Aldhous, 2012). In one competition, crowdsourced users 
improved upon an insurance company’s risk model by 270% (“Kaggle Winners Tapped As Data 
Analytics Consultants,” n.d.), and one machine learning competition platform reports that in every 
competition with an industry benchmark, the crowd has produced a better model (Byrne, n.d.).  
The data science problem that participants face involves issues of variable selection and feature 
engineering, which are perhaps the most important aspects of data analysis, especially in the era 
of “big data” that are “wide,” in the sense of having a large number of predictor variables (Kuhn & 
Johnson, 2013). As a result, selecting an appropriate subset of predictor variables is an 
increasingly challenging problem for data scientists and researchers, and detecting feature 
importance and generating new features are processes at the frontiers of data science because 
they cannot always be automated and require creative human input. 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the thesis that network efficiency has an inverse 
relationship to problem complexity. As the problem complexity increases, reductions in network 
efficiency promote more effective problem-solving. This study examines these dynamics among 
human problem-solvers who are solving a realistic complex problem. The assumptions about 
agents embedded in current theoretical models that make these counter-intuitive predictions 
about network efficiency and collective performance might depart significantly from the behavior 
of humans, so testing how humans solve complex problems as part of a larger collaboration 
network is important. Additionally, due to the uncertainty arising from previous experimental 
studies, this study seeks to provide clear causal evidence about whether communication structure 
is an effective tool for managing information diversity and group performance in technological and 
scientific problems. I rely on a model of technological and scientific innovation rather than search 
across one- and two-dimensional problem spaces. As a result, this study seeks to generalize to a 
wider branch of complex, high-dimensional problems, such as biomedical research, technological 
innovation, and software design, as opposed to only a domain of problems involving search 
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across low-dimensional spaces. In order for significant resources to be invested in restructuring 
collaboration networks, it must first be made clear that the effects hold up consistently in a 
representative problem in science and technology and second that these effects are substantively 
large and consistent. 
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section examines the Basic Theory 
and Model and presents the theoretical prediction that inefficient networks are better for complex 
problems. The second section examines results from an Experimental Study to test these ideas. 
And the third section expands the theoretical scope of these ideas by considering a Revised 
Model that examines ways managers can manipulate collaborative efficiency beyond network 
structure. The original theory considered only the possibility of rewiring network ties in an 
undirected, unweighted network. But I extend the theory by considering how managers might be 
able to reduce collaborative efficiency in other ways by considering weighted and dynamically 
evolving networks. This expanded theoretical model offers more practical ways that managers 
can adjust the efficiency of their collaboration networks in order to increase collective 
performance. 
Basic Theory and Model 
Exploration-Exploitation Tradeoff 
The complex problems studied here are members of a well-defined class of problems in which 
agents receive a reward signal based on their current state and attempt to adjust their policy, or 
behavior, in an attempt to maximize their utility (Sutton & Barto, 1998). In these reinforcement 
learning problems, individuals can repeatedly submit solutions and receive ongoing feedback 
from the environment informing them of their performance. These problems often require 
individuals to navigate through a large, high-dimensional space to find globally optimal solutions 
in the face of uncertain payoffs. Additionally, individuals typically operate in parallel, meaning all 
the agents are working on the same problem and their payoffs do not affect each other (Lazer & 
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Friedman, 2007). Examples include physicians discovering a correct diagnosis and prescription 
(Coleman et al., 1957), pharmaceutical engineers refining drugs to slow cancer growth, software 
developers moving through cycles of design and testing to refine the efficiency of a new program 
(Graham & Sichelman, 2010), state governments crafting public policy based on information 
about past effectiveness (Walker, 1969), financial analysts updating portfolio allocations based on 
previous performance (Pan et al., 2012), or data scientists revising their predictive models in a 
machine learning contest. In such problems, individuals face a tradeoff between exploiting 
already existing solutions in the network and exploring new options, which are risky and 
uncertain, but offer the possibility for breakthroughs that improve the entire group (Gupta et al., 
2006; March, 1991; Sutton & Barto, 1998). Maintaining the correct balance between exploration 
and exploitation is crucial to group performance, and changing the network structure is a central 
theorized way to achieve an optimal balance (Lazer & Friedman, 2007; March, 1991). 
Efficiency and Performance 
Theoretical models of the effect of collaboration structure on group performance on complex 
problems have been developed using simulations from agent-based models (ABMs). For 
example, theoretical work has examined how individual decision rules for innovation versus 
imitation affect the group’s performance (Rendell et al., 2010; Roberts & Goldstone, 2006). More 
relevant to this study, two ABMs have examined the importance of collaboration structure (Fang 
et al., 2010; Lazer & Friedman, 2007), and this study works from the model of Lazer and 
Friedman (L&F), detailed below (Lazer & Friedman, 2007). 
Model 
In the L&F model, agents search across a complex, high-dimension problem space. Each 
solution is a bit string (a sequence of 0’s and 1’s) that indicates a binary decision in each 
dimension. On each round, individuals behave according to the following rules. First, they check if 
any of their network neighbors have a better solution than their current solution. If there is a better 
one, they copy the max solution from their neighbors. If none of their neighbors have a better 
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solution, they change their current solution by randomly altering one element of their solution bit 
string. If that change is better then, their current solution, they adopt it, and if it is no better, then 
they return to their previous solution. Agents behave deterministically in this fashion, but due to 
the randomness inherent in the search process, different collective outcomes can emerge for the 
identical starting positions. 
L&F examine the effect of efficient versus inefficient networks on a group’s performance 
when solving such a complex problem. Efficiency was measured as the average path length in 
each network.
1
 The higher the average path length, the less efficient the network was. On each 
round, agents searched across a complex, high-dimensional problem space, either by exploring a 
new option or by copying a solution from one of their neighbors in the network. They find that on 
complex problems, efficient networks allowed groups to perform better in the short-term because 
information about initially promising solutions was disseminated rapidly. However, efficient 
networks performed worse in the long-run compared with inefficient networks because early 
copying prematurely restricted the efficient network’s search to a smaller portion of the 
landscape. This reduction in information diversity made it less likely that they would find the 
globally optimal solution. These findings reversed for simple problems: efficient networks 
performed better in both the short- and long-term because there was no possibility of getting 
stuck on suboptimal solutions in a simple problem. 
Previous Results 
While theoretical models provide a clear series of results on the effect of network structure on 
collective problem-solving (Fang et al., 2010; Lazer & Friedman, 2007), experimental studies 
have provided conflicting evidence in support of the hypotheses. One initial study found 
supporting evidence for the theory, while a second larger follow-up study found disconfirming 
evidence (Mason et al., 2008; Mason & Watts, 2012; Wisdom et al., 2013). The conflicting 
                                                          
1 Average path length is the average number of steps along the shortest paths for all possible 
pair of nodes. 
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experimental evidence can be resolved by designing an experiment that draws from the 
theoretical research. In particular, experimental studies need to use models of complex problems 
that capture the interdependencies among high-dimensional options in technological and 
scientific problems. 
The theoretical studies provide agents with a complex problem that draws deeply from 
models of technological and scientific innovation. In contrast, experimental tests have tended to 
simplify the problem to searching across one- or two-dimensional landscapes. This abstraction 
and simplification does not capture the richness of scientific innovation. The theoretical work 
conceives of complex problems as requiring optimization along numerous dimensions (Kauffman, 
1995; Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal & March, 1981; J. Miller & Page, 2009; 
Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Complex problems have a high level of interdependency among 
their parts. One dimension may interact with others in surprising and unpredictable ways, 
producing non-monotonic relationships among the dimensions and making the direction of future 
innovation uncertain (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Kauffman, 1993; Kauffman et al., 2000; 
Kauffman & Macready, 1995). 
Most real technological innovations have such complex interdependencies. For example, 
research on semiconductors has shown the crucial interdependence between temperature and 
the amount of impurity in silicon. Small changes in impurity levels have drastic effects on a 
semiconductor’s resistance to electrical current at certain temperatures, such that at many levels 
the semiconductor fails. However, at other levels of interaction, the system provides valuable 
electrical properties (Millman, 1979). 
These complex problems in science and technology are often conceptualized as 
movement across a “fitness landscape,” which is a term originating in biology to refer to the 
distribution of fitness values for all combinations of a genotype (Wright, 1932). In technology, a 
fitness landscape refers to the performance of a solution on some dimension as a function of the 
solution, where each solution is a decision across numerous dimensions. I use the NK model to 
capture the interdependency among each component, following theoretical studies of complexity 
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(Kauffman, 1993, 1995; Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Valente, 2008). The primary benefit of the NK 
model as a representation of complex problems is that it offers a parameter to directly manipulate 
complexity. Additionally, its statistical properties are well understood (Kauffman, 1993). The 
model is often used to understand technological and scientific innovation (Fleming & Sorenson, 
2001; Kauffman et al., 2000; Kauffman & Macready, 1995; Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Levinthal, 
1997; March, 1991). 
Two parameters control the NK model. N indicates the dimensionality of the problem, 
where a problem space is modeled as a bit string of length N with a 1 indicating that a component 
has been activated, and a 0 indicating a component’s deactivation.
2
 From the perspective of the 
agent, the goal is to determine which combination of 0’s and 1’s will make the best solution. 
Calculating the “fitness” of a solution depends upon the second parameter, K, which determines 
the level of interdependence between each dimension. When K = 0, each bit contributes to the 
fitness independently. But when K > 0, the components interact, and the fitness contribution of 
each element depends on K other components. 
While it is impossible to plot high-dimensional problem spaces, Figure 1 shows a one-
dimensional stylization of the difference between a simple problem space when K = 0 (panel A) 
and a complex one when K > 0 (panel B). Simple problems have an easily identifiable global 
maximum. When agents adjust their input along the x-axis by continually searching across and 
updating their position along their local environment, they will eventually reach the peak. In 
contrast, complex landscapes have many local maxima. Since individuals and organizations 
typically search incrementally (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; March & Simon, 1958; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982; Stuart & Podolny, 1996), they tend to get caught on local maxima in 
complex landscapes. Complex problems are thus rugged, multi-peaked fitness landscapes in 
                                                          
2 A third parameter, A, allows each dimension to have more than two options, and numerous 
models have expanded upon this idea (Li et al., 2006; Valente, 2008), but the central statistical 
properties of NK landscapes are invariant to these changes (Kauffman, 1993). 
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numerous dimensions, where “rugged” refers to the number of local maxima where agents can 
get stuck.  
 
Fig. 1. Simple and complex landscapes in one dimension. 
 
In contrast to the rich models of complexity used in the theoretical studies, the 
experiments that have attempted to test this theory have tended to simplify the task to search 
across one- (Mason et al., 2008) and two-dimensional spaces (Mason & Watts, 2012). For 
example, in Mason and Watts (M&W) (Mason & Watts, 2012), subjects played an online game 
called “Wildcat Wells,” where they searched across a desert landscape to find the best locations 
to drill an oil well. The underlying landscape was a hilly space with multiple peaks, or locally 
optimal drilling locations. Such spaces allow generalization to an important domain of problems, 
including search and rescue operations, but they do not capture the multi-dimensionality of 
technological and scientific innovation. 
Such simplification is concerning because the theory stresses an interaction between 
problem complexity and network structure. As problem complexity increases, reductions in 
network efficiency will promote more effective problem solving. But when problems are very 
simple, increases in network efficiency will lead to the best results (Lazer & Friedman, 2007). 
These theoretical ideas help explain why M&W found that efficient networks were always better 
on a two-dimensional problem space—a finding that runs contrary to the theoretical predictions. 
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But it is doubtful that the findings from M&W generalize to technological and scientific search on 
more complex problems. Having the proper model of a complex problem is thus crucial. The 
primary benefit of the NK model as a representation of complex problems is that it offers a 
parameter to directly manipulate complexity so that the modeler can rapidly tune a multi-
dimensional problem space between simple and complex (Kauffman, 1993). The model of 
complex problems used in this study (the NK Model) allows me to more precisely test hypotheses 
about the interaction between problem difficulty and network structure than previous experiments 
have allowed. 
Additionally, the individuals in M&W likely did not explore incrementally, as individuals 
were free to jump throughout the problem space to very distant regions, and most of the users in 
the study appeared to explore in a random, global manner. In contrast, most research on 
scientific, technological, and organizational innovation stresses that groups explore myopically by 
making incremental changes to existing practices and methods (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 
1991; March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). Such incremental 
movements are a rational response when exploring is costly or when organizations are in a highly 
competitive environment where the risk of moving far away from an existing solution could result 
in institutional failure. The ability and incentives to explore non-incrementally meant that getting 
caught on locally optimal solutions was unlikely because subjects could simply look at other 
solutions and search close to them. 
Further, M&W provided the visual position of other players and then allowed users to 
either directly copy that location or explore. However, users could use information about the 
position of others when forming their decision to explore. Users could explore close to other 
users, meaning that they were receiving a social signal and combining it with their exploration. 
For example, participants rarely directly copied each other, but instead explored similar locations 
based on social information. This popularity effect results in a mixture between pure copying and 
pure exploration that is outside of the theoretical model. It likely reduced the amount of pure 
copying that players used in the experiment. Such a strong reduction in direct, measured copying 
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would weaken the effects of the collaboration network manipulations and would make it more 
likely for the efficient network to perform well. I have conducted simulations that show that 
reductions in the amount of actual copying behavior could eliminate the differences between 
conditions. 
A more recent paper explores the effect of network structure on the ability of groups to 
solve a whodunit problem, such as playing the game of Clue (Shore et al., 2015). The problem 
was meant to have a higher degree of verisimilitude and involved gathering information about a 
terrorist plot and formulating theories based on how the plot occurred. The study found supportive 
evidence for the theorized inverse relationship between network efficiency and collective 
performance. This problem offers substantial improvements upon search across a two-
dimensional map. The multiple dimensions of the problem (Who would carry out the attack? What 
would be the target? Where would the attack take place? And when would it occur?) generalize to 
a broader space of realistic problems. Additionally, they produce dynamics where individuals are 
resistant to random global search and instead search incrementally, which is more realistic. 
However, this problem departs significantly from the theoretical NK model, as it offers no way to 
directly manipulate the problem complexity and instead only produces a large problem space 
without any guarantees about complexity. In fact, complexity in this area simply means the size of 
the problem space, which is a product of the size of the four dimensions (Who? What? Where? 
When?). This paper supports the theorized inverse relationship between network efficiency and 
group performance, but it is unclear whether whodunit problems can map onto an important 
domain of problems involving technological and scientific innovations. 
Taken together, the existing empirical results provide conflicting evidence about whether 
managers and policymakers should reduce the efficiency of their collaboration networks in order 
to increase collective performance. We currently do not know if taking such profound actions 
would be beneficial for structuring scientific or corporate collaboration networks. Before funding 
agencies incentivize different collaboration structures or corporate research divisions restructure 
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their organizations, it is important to know whether these effects exist and how large the effect 
sizes are when groups solve complex problems. 
Experimental Design 
Task 
To causally identify the relationship between network efficiency and collective performance, I 
developed a complex task that had several important properties: (1) maximum problem realism, 
which means that the task was a particular real-world complex problem that shared similar 
features to other complex problems; (2) maximum subject realism, which means that the subjects 
we recruited should be the people who actually work on these complex problems in the real 
world, not just convenience samples; and (3) maximum accuracy of data collection, which means 
that we could capture as much behavioral data as possible without relying on any self-report 
measures. 
To satisfy these three criteria, the experiment consisted of a Data Science Competition 
where experts in statistics were recruited from the World Wide Web to solve a complex problem. 
Statistics and data science competitions have become increasingly popular online, where 
individuals compete to build the best statistical forecast model that makes the most accurate 
predictions (criteria 1). For example, one of the data problems in our study required subjects to 
predict sales volumes at a retailer as a function of economic variables. I built an online platform 
that allowed us to recruit interested and motivated individuals online who have quantitative skills 
(criteria 2). The structure of the competition was round-based, which allowed us to unobtrusively 
measure subjects’ decisions to either explore new solutions or exploit existing ones over 15 
distinct rounds in the competition (criteria 3). 
Subjects interacted with the competition using a custom-built platform that displayed their 
model performance on each round and allowed them to revise their solution (Fig. 2). The 
competition lasted for 15 rounds. In each round, individuals decided either to explore or exploit.  
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Exploration meant changing their solution by adding or removing a single variable from their 
statistical model. To search incrementally for a better solution, individuals could select a single 
variable to add or remove from their current model (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; 
March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). Exploiting meant coping 
an existing solution from a network neighbor. Additionally, individuals could maintain their current 
solution. To copy a better solution, individuals saw the performance scores of their best network 
neighbors, and could choose to adopt a better solution. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Screenshot of the experimental interface. To explore their model, individuals could 
interact with their current solution by changing a variable in the top left panel. To exploit 
neighboring solutions, participants could select a better model from their network neighbor in the 
top right panel. When individuals had a made a selection for that round, they pressed the 
“Submit” button, and then proceeded to the next round. The bottom panel contained plotting 
information about their current model solution. 
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Once a participant submitted a decision for the round, they received immediate feedback 
on the performance of their new solution. If the solution was better, they adopted it, and 
proceeded to the next round, and if the solution was worse, they were returned to their previous 
solution. Each round lasted for 1 minute. Individuals never knew if they had the best possible 
solution, and they were incentivized to find better solutions each round, and received financial 
rewards based on the quality of their final solution. 
Models were scored based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The BIC is a 
good asymptotic measure of out-of-sample model performance and performs similarly to cross-
validation predictive accuracy (Shao, 1997), so it captures the ability of the model to predict 
unseen data. The BIC rewards constructing sparse models that explain sufficient variance in the 
dependent variable. 
The forecasting problems were sufficiently complex, and involved subjects solving a high-
dimensional combinatorial optimization problem. Complex problems have high interdependency 
among the components of the solutions such that changing one dimension affects the fitness 
contribution from another dimension (Kauffman, 1993; Kauffman et al., 2000; Kauffman & 
Macready, 1995). Such synergies among the components produce many local maxima in the 
problem space so that incremental, local search can miss the global maximum. Performance 
metrics such as BIC penalize variables that do not provide additional information. In a simple 
landscape, where variables do not interact, each predictor variable contributes statistically 
independent information that improves the quality of the model. When a variable explains no 
variance in the predictor variable, its contribution is clear because the BIC will decline. In contrast, 
in a complex landscape, there are correlations among the variables, which is common in real 
world data sets. Variables often contain redundant information that is already captured by another 
variables. As a result, adding redundant information to the model will result in a worse BIC score 
and worse out-of-sample performance because the model is effectively being fit to noise that is 
idiosyncratic to the training data set. 
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To ensure that the data science problems in this study had this complex structure, I 
adopted existing data sets and increased the correlations among the variables. The procedure 
works by holding fixed the amount of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by all 
the predictor variables, but then shuffling that predictive variation among the predictor variables. 
By altering the correlation among the X’s, we can shift from a simple to a complex problem. In a 
complex problem, the contribution to the fitness of one variable depends on whether another 
variable is already included in the model or not. This interdependency among the components 
produces a complex fitness landscape. 
To ensure that the results did not depend upon a single problem, I used three data sets 
to generate complex data science problems. The data problems contained numerous locally 
optimal but globally suboptimal solutions, ranging from 9 to 16 local optima, and the number of 
possible solutions ranged from 2,048 to 16,384. 
Recruitment 
 In order to recruit subject who were specialized in statistics and quantitative methods, I 
contacted individuals in quantitative departments of several universities, and advertised in several 
online forums that are frequented by individuals with interest in statistics and data science. 
Individuals had taken a mean of 3 (sd=3.6) upper-level statistics courses. 
Experimental Treatments 
 The structure of the collaboration network determined which solutions an individual could 
see and choose to copy. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two collaboration networks 
(Fig. 3). In the efficient network, the structure was a fully connected network, which has the 
minimum possible average path length (L = 1). In the inefficient network, the structure was a ring 
lattice, where each individual was connected to their nearest four neighbors, which has a larger 
average path length (L = 1.67 for N = 10, and L = 2.89 for N = 20). In total, 14 independent 
networks were run, with seven matched pair trials. In the first six trials, populations of size N = 10 
were used in each condition, and in the final trial, the population sizes were increased to N = 20. 
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In total, there were 160 unique participants in the study. To make each group in a trial as similar 
as possible, each participant was given a random solution that was matched with an identical 
initial solution in the other network within a given trial. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Network structures in the experiment. Each experimental trial consisted of two 
networks, one efficient (PL = 1), and one inefficient (PL=1.67 or 2.89). In each of the seven trials, 
subjects were randomly assigned to one network condition, and then randomly assigned to a 
single node in the network. On the initial round of each trial, subjects received a random starting 
solution. On subsequent rounds, subjects saw the performance of their immediate network 
contacts and could copy these solutions. In a single trial, random initial solutions were matched 
across conditions, and faced the same data science problem. 
 
 Participants in the study were shown an identical user interface in both experimental 
conditions. Features of the social network, such as the average path length and the size of the 
population, were unobservable to participants. More generally, every aspect of the participants’ 
experience was equivalent across experimental conditions. The only difference was the structure 
of the social networks. Thus, any differences in solution quality may be attributed to the effects of 
network efficiency on the process of collective innovation. 
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Measures 
Diversity 
 Group-level solution diversity was measured in two ways. The first considered the 
number of unique solutions. Several different units of time were considered, including each round 
as well as cumulatively across the entire experiment. The second measure attempted to quantify 
the magnitude of diversity beyond a simple count of the number of unique solutions. The 
Hamming distance is defined as the number of differences in the elements of two strings. We 
took the average Hamming distance of a group’s solutions, comparing each individual to every 
other individual and then averaging across the entire group.  
Diffusion and Convergence Speed 
 Diffusion speed was measured as the fraction of individuals who adopted the best 
solution on the rounds following its discovery by a member of that group. The convergence speed 
measured the number of rounds until an individual adopted the solution that was best in that 
network.  
Rate of Exploration 
 On each round, individuals could either choose to explore by submitting a new solution, 
copy by selecting another participant’s solution, or maintain their current solution. This mutually 
exclusive division between exploration and exploitation reflects the way that these problems have 
been conceptualized in theoretical and empirical research (Lazer & Friedman, 2007; March, 
1991; Mason & Watts, 2012; Shore et al., 2015). Explorations were registered within the 
database when individuals selected to add or remove a model component and pressed the 
submit button. The rate of exploration simply measured the proportion of all submissions that 
involved a decision to revise an existing solution. 
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Performance 
Performance was measured in two ways to capture different utility functions that groups might 
have. The maximum performance captured the best solution that was found in each group. This 
metric is of interested in group-problem solving situations where an organization will only 
implement a single solution, such as among a team of engineers designing a new product. In 
contrast, the average performance took the arithmetic mean across all the individual solutions 
within a group. This metric is of interest when the utility function of a group depends upon all 
members, such as among a team of salespeople who have different strategies for pursuing leads 
and who ultimately generate the total sales revenue for a company. 
The performance of each model was measured in terms of its Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC), which is also known as the Schwarz Criterion (Schwarz, 1978). The BIC is a 
measure of a model’s out of sample performance on a new data set that the model has not seen 
before. The BIC is a function both of the likelihood function and a regularization term that 
penalizes the addition of more parameters. The BIC is defined as: 
)ln(ˆln2 nkLBIC 
 
where Lˆ is the maximum of the likelihood function of the model, k is the number of free 
parameters to be estimated, and n is the number of observations in the data set. In the case of a 
linear regression used in the experiment, k is the number of regressors including the intercept in 
the model. In short, the BIC metric rewards models that fit the data closely, while penalizing 
models that are overly complex and rely on many parameters. 
 To create a measure of group performance, I rescaled the BIC metric onto the range 
[0,1]. Since a lower BIC indicates that a model is a better fit to the data, I created the following 
measure of group performance by transforming the BIC as follows: 
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where the numerator is the difference between group i’s average starting solution on the initial 
round (t=0) and the maximum solution on the current round t, and the denominator is the 
difference between the group’s average starting solution and the best possible solution. To 
capture average group performance, I use the following formula: 
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where the numerator is the difference between the group’s average solution at t=0 and the 
group’s average at time t, and the denominator is the same. Both metrics range from 0 (the 
group’s initial solution) to 1 (the best possible solution), and indicate how much groups have 
improved from their initial starting solution. The average initial starting solution was fixed between 
conditions within a given trial because I matched the same starting solutions between conditions, 
and the best possible solution was fixed for each data set. As a result, this metric is directly 
comparable between conditions only if individuals started from the same solutions in both 
conditions and they used the same data problem. 
Statistical Analysis 
Analysis 
 The analysis is conducted at the group level because the network structure treatment is 
applied to the group as a whole. As a result, an individual-level analysis would violate 
assumptions about independence. At the individual-level, I had 160 unique subjects, but at the 
group level, I had only 14 groups. To ensure that the analysis was conservative with such a small 
sample size of groups, I used the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test to make paired 
comparisons between trials, and the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test to make comparisons 
between the distributions of both conditions. These tests were used to evaluate the hypotheses 
about solution diversity, speed of diffusion, rates of exploration, and performance. Additionally, a 
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Cox proportional hazards model was constructed to test how the time to convergence differed 
between conditions.   
Attrition 
 There was a low attrition rate for the entire experiment: 14% of subjects did not complete 
all rounds of the competition. There was no significant difference in attrition rates between 
conditions (P = 0.75, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Data was used from individuals until they left the 
study, or finished the final round. 
Experimental Results 
 Our results provide support for the proposition that slow collaboration as manipulated 
through inefficiency in the network structure promotes collective diversity, which improves 
collective performance. 
Solution Diversity 
 Inefficient networks had more group-level diversity of solutions than efficient networks 
(Fig. 4). Inefficient networks explored a larger portion of the solution space, on average exploring 
36% more distinct solutions throughout the experiment compared to efficient networks (P = 0.03, 
Wilcoxon signed rank test) (Fig. 4A). On every round, inefficient networks had more unique 
solutions (Fig. 4B), averaging 72% more distinct solutions at each time point in inefficient 
networks compared to efficient networks (P < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank sum test). On average, 
inefficient networks were 55% more diverse in terms of the Hamming distance of the solutions 
offered as compared to efficient networks (p = 0.03 Wilcoxon signed rank test) (Fig. 4C). 
Individuals in inefficient networks had solutions that were on average 4.4 steps away from the 
other members of the group, as compared to only 2.8 changes in efficient networks. 
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Fig. 4. Diversity of solutions. Panel A: The average number of distinct solutions in efficient and 
inefficient networks across all trials. Panel B: Average number of distinct solutions on each round. 
Panel C: Average Hamming distance of all solutions in efficient and inefficient networks. Error 
bars show 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
Speed of Diffusion 
 Networks with higher path lengths were less efficient in terms of the speed of diffusing 
good solutions. When an individual found the solution that would be the best in the efficient 
network, an average of 76% of individuals adopted it on the following round (Fig. 5). In contrast, 
only an average of 32% of individuals adopted the best solution on the next round after its 
discovery in an inefficient network, which was significantly lower than efficient networks (P < 0.01, 
Wilcoxon rank sum test). 
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Fig. 5. Rate of solution diffusion. Mean proportion of individuals adopting the top solution on 
the round after it was found (t+1). Error bars show two standard errors of the mean. 
 
Speed of Convergence 
Efficient networks were more likely to converge prematurely on an early solution than inefficient 
networks. Figure 6 shows the Kaplan-Meier plot of the survival time until individuals adopted the 
solution that was best in their network. On average across all trials, the hazard of adopting the 
best solution was 83% higher in efficient networks as compared to inefficient networks (P < 0.01, 
Cox proportional hazards model), which indicates that individuals were quicker to adopt in 
efficient networks. 
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Fig. 6. Kaplan-Meier survival plot of the time until adoption of the top solution. Survival 
indicates an individual has not adopted the best solution. Efficient networks adopted their best 
solution earlier and more quickly than inefficient networks. 
 
Rate of Exploration 
In contrast to the significant differences in diffusion rates and speed of convergence, there were 
no difference in decisions to explore new solutions between conditions. Network structure did not 
affect the rate of exploration among subjects (P = 0.93, Wilcoxon signed rank test) (Fig. 7). This 
finding differs from previous studies that have found significant increases in exploration when 
teams were embedded in more efficient networks (Mason & Watts, 2012). 
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Fig. 7. Attempts to explore new solutions. The average fraction of plays that were attempts to 
explore a new solution are plotted for each network across all trials. Error bars are two standard 
errors of the mean. 
 
Performance 
 Inefficient networks led to better performance at the collective level. Inefficient networks 
discovered better top solutions than efficient networks in every trial (P = 0.02, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test) (Fig. 8). On average, inefficient networks found solutions that were 21% better than 
those discovered by efficient networks. Additionally, in three out of the seven trials, inefficient 
networks discovered the best possible solution, which was verified after an exhaustive search of 
the entire solution space. 
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Fig. 8. Difference in performance between inefficient and efficient networks. The difference 
between the maximum solution found by an individual in inefficient and efficient networks is 
plotted across all seven trials. Inefficient networks found better top solutions than efficient 
networks in all trials.  
 
Average Group Performance 
The results for the average group performance confirm the theoretical prediction that in the short-
term efficient networks will diffuse better solutions and perform better, but in the long-term, 
inefficient networks will find better solutions and improve the group’s average (Fig. 9). After the 
first round of the competition, inefficient networks had average solutions that were 30% worse 
than efficient networks (P < 0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank). However, by the final round, every 
inefficient network had a better average solution than its efficient network pair. On average, 
inefficient networks generated mean solutions that were 17% higher than efficient networks by 
the end of the study (P = 0.02, Wilcoxon signed-rank). 
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Fig. 9. Average performance in efficient and inefficient networks across time. Lines 
represent the average performance across all seven trials for efficient (light) and inefficient (dark) 
networks. Average performance was initially higher within every efficient networks as compared 
to inefficient networks. However, by the study’s conclusion inefficient networks had a better 
average performance than efficient networks within each trial. 
 
Cumulative Performance of the Average 
 Investing in inefficient networks requires a tradeoff between the short-term, where 
average solutions are worse than efficient networks, and the long-term, where eventually better 
solutions are found and diffused to the entire population. To understand these tradeoffs, the 
cumulative performance of each group’s performance across all trials is plotted in Figure 10. In 
short time frames, inefficient networks have a large cost in comparison to efficient networks (Fig. 
10A). However, after round 13, inefficient networks have recovered this cost, and cumulatively 
outperform efficient networks, a trend that will continue indefinitely because the efficient networks 
have gotten stuck on a suboptimal solution. More striking is the results for top performance, 
where inefficient networks consistently offer better solutions for all time (Fig. 10B). 
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Fig. 10. Payoff to investing in inefficient networks relative to efficient networks. Panel A: 
Difference in cumulative average performance over time (inefficient minus efficient). Red line 
indicate times where it is better to invest in efficient networks, whereas black line indicates where 
the cumulative return is higher to inefficient networks. Panel B: Difference in top performance 
over time (inefficient minus efficient). 
 
Robustness to Non-Local Exploration 
To examine the sensitivity of the results to design choices, I conducted a robustness experiment 
with N=10 individuals in an inefficient and efficient network. The main experiment allowed 
individuals to make a single revision each round (i.e., incremental search). This design captured 
realistic search processes by individuals and organizations in high-risk situations, where there are 
strong incentives to add incrementally to a solution (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; 
March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). To examine if the results 
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are robust to this design constraint, I permitted individuals to make as many changes to their 
model on each round before submitting their new solution and receiving feedback. Allowing this 
non-incremental search might affect the results by preventing efficient networks from getting 
stuck on suboptimal solutions because an individual could get lucky and find another peak even 
though the group had converged on an initial solution. 
I ran a single efficient network and allowed individual to make non-incremental searches, 
and compared the performance of this efficient network to the inefficient networks that were 
restricted to only incremental search. I expect that allowing non-incremental search will increase 
performance. The results show that allowing individuals to search non-incrementally did not 
substantively change the results in any way. The inefficient network still performed 11% better 
than the efficient network, and there were very little differences between the efficient network with 
incremental search and prior trials that allowed only non-incremental search. 
 
Fig. 11. Performance differences between conditions was robust to allowing non-
incremental search. 
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 At the individual level, participants did attempt to explore more widely when given the 
option to conduct non-incremental search. Across all attempts to explore, 38% of attempts 
involved non-incremental search. However, a majority of these attempts were unsuccessful, and 
individuals were more successful when they explored incrementally. When incremental 
exploration was used, individuals successfully found a better solution 19.4% of the time, in 
contrast to a success rate of only 9.8% for attempts to change more than one element of their 
solution. This result suggests that incremental exploration is both preferred by individuals, and 
also represents a more informed choice because the quality of the solution will likely be more 
similar to the current solution. 
Discussion of Experimental Results 
 Slowing down the rate of collaboration increased the performance of groups of 
statisticians and data scientists when they solved a complex problems. Inefficient networks with 
higher average path length restricted the diffusion of solutions, which led to more diversity. In 
contrast to previous empirical results, I find no evidence that efficient networks provide a benefit 
to collective performance (Mason & Watts, 2012). Instead, the results agree with previous 
theoretical (Lazer & Friedman, 2007) and empirical research (Mason et al., 2008) showing that 
slowing down collaboration can prevent groupthink and premature adoption of suboptimal 
solutions. 
 While previous research found higher rates of exploration in efficient networks as 
compared to inefficient networks (Mason & Watts, 2012), we find no differences between 
conditions in the rate of exploration. This difference can be explained because their design 
allowed for partial copying where individuals could explore close to the previous solutions that 
others had offered. Such social influence and popularity effects can profoundly alter the collective 
dynamics when searching across 2-dimensional landscapes, which can create particle swarm 
dynamics (Eberhart & Kennedy, 1995; Eberhart, Shi, & Kennedy, 2001). In contrast, this study 
assumed that individuals were either exploring or copying, and that these were categorically 
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distinct from one another, which is in line with previous research on the exploration–exploitation 
tradeoff (Lazer & Friedman, 2007; Shore et al., 2015). By not confounding the results with social 
influence and popularity, this study showed no difference in individual exploration across 
conditions. This is because the original theory actually predicts no difference in individual 
exploration on average across conditions for rates of exploration. 
Revised Model 
The experiment was able to confirm the theoretical model, which posits that increasing 
inefficiency in terms of network average path length increases a group’s solution quality when 
they are solving a complex problem. This has important implications for how managers establish 
ties among the members of an organization, such as the connections among members of a 
research and development arm of an organization (Kim & Park, 2009). However, there are many 
situations where managers cannot add or remove the ties in a network, such as when individuals 
have the ability to choose their own ties. Additionally, even if managers have the ability to rewire 
a network to maintain a desired collaborative inefficiency, these rewired networks can be fragile. 
The addition of a single long tie that spans the network can dramatically increase the 
collaborative efficiency of the network and undermine attempts to maintain inefficient 
collaboration as determined by high average path lengths (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). As a result, 
even though the effects in this study are substantively important, they may be difficult to 
practically implement as currently theorized. 
The theoretical literature has developed the idea that network slowness can be 
manipulated by the average path length of the network. Research has focused on undirected, 
unweighted graphs. Here, I develop the idea that “collaborative slowness” can be manipulated in 
other ways, namely weighted path length (e.g., communication costs) and temporal networks that 
delay communication and prevent premature convergence. 
The central idea is that longer average path lengths slow down collaboration. The insight 
that inefficiency or slowness might promote collective problem-solving immediately suggests two 
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alternative ways to improve collective problem-solving that draw on recent work in network 
science. First, communication costs, or the costs to form a tie or use an existing tie, can slow 
down collaboration (Goyal & Vega-Redondo, 2005; Jackson, 2005; Slikker & van den Nouweland, 
2000). These communication costs can be conceptualized as placing weights on each tie so that 
individuals pay different attention to each of their neighbors based on the strength of the network 
tie. By adjusting the weights on these ties, it is possible for a manager to tune the weighted 
average path length of a network. 
Second temporal networks can manipulate the speed and frequency of collaboration. 
Temporal or dynamic networks involve changes in the network structure over time (Gloor, 2005; 
Holme & Saramäki, 2012; Juszczyszyn, Musial, Kazienko, & Gabrys, 2012). Networks that 
dynamically rewire over time, perhaps from influence by managers, offer the possibility of fine-
tuning the collaboration structure to account for the unfolding process of collective exploration 
over time. In initial discovery phases, groups might collaborate less frequently to increase the 
diversity of solutions. However, later in the process, the network structure might be made more 
efficient so that the best solutions are rapidly diffused to the population. 
In this section, I explore theoretically how these two manipulations of collective efficiency affect 
the dynamics of group problem-solving. 
Simulation Results 
To examine the effect of these additional manipulations of collaborative slowness, I conduct a 
series of agent-based models using the same basic model as L&F (2007). The simulations then 
examine how variations in collaboration structure affect the group’s performance. Figure 12, 
Panel A replicates the basic finding from L&F: making a network more inefficient by increasing its 
path length leads to better collective performance in the long run. The most efficient network (red) 
performs worse in the long-run in comparison to the least efficient network (blue). 
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Fig. 12. The effects of network efficiency on collective performance. Panel A replicates L&F 
by considering the probability of rewiring ring lattices using the small worlds model (Watts & 
Strogatz, 1998). Probabilities include p = 0.01, 0.1, and 0.3, which are equivalent to average path 
lengths of 8.6, 4.2, and 3.6. As path length increases, the average performance increases. Panel 
B examines communication costs for copying a neighbor’s solution in a fully connected network. 
As costs increase, the network performance increases. Panel C examines the timing of meetings 
in a fully connected network. As the meeting time is delayed from round 1, to 5, and to 10, 
performance increases. Within a single replication of each simulation, agents begin at the same 
locations, thus allowing for within-subjects confidence intervals, which are very small in the 
figures. All panels use 1,000 simulations with 100 agents in each network. 
 
To examine how performance is affected by communication costs, I revise the basic 
model in the following way. Instead of always copying a neighbor’s solution if it is better than their 
own, agents must pay a tax for copying another solution. Agents will only copy if the neighbor’s 
solution minus a tax is better than their current solution. This manipulation can also be 
understood as imposing switching costs for adopting a radically new solution. In contrast to the 
intuition that communication costs might harm a collective’s performance, the simulations in 
Figure 12, Panel B show that as communication costs increase, groups perform better in the long 
run. Networks with the most efficient communication (red) perform worse than networks with 
higher communication costs (blue). The intuition is that these costs will encourage agents to 
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search more widely, but when a far better solution is found, it will still be able to diffuse across the 
network. 
The simulations for temporal networks alter the baseline model by considering the effect 
of meeting time on performance (Figure 12, Panel C). Meetings are defined as a fully connected 
network. On times where there are no meetings, agents search in isolation. The effect of 
meetings is consistently large for all times, as it improves average performance. However, the 
largest absolute performance comes from delaying the meeting time (blue) as opposed to 
meeting early in the design process (red). Each additional round that a meeting is delayed 
increases the likelihood that a superior solution is found. 
Discussion of Simulation Results 
Collectively, these theoretical models expand the scope of the theory involving collective problem 
solving by examining alternative mechanisms that slow down a group’s exploitation of known 
solutions. In addition to the theoretical results, these findings have important policy benefits. For 
example, maintaining a network structure with a high path length might be difficult for a manager 
or policymaker, especially with decentralized agents. When a network with long path length, such 
as a ring lattice, adds only a few random ties, its path length rapidly diminishes. In other words, if 
even a few individuals within an organization build long ties, the benefit from high path length can 
be rapidly erased. Maintaining this high path length can be a difficult problem that requires 
repeated, costly intervention on the part of managers and policymakers. While managers and 
policymakers may have little control over the network structure, they often do have control over 
communication costs or the timing of meetings and conferences. In what follows, I expand on the 
policy actions that might arise from this research. 
 Research into communication costs has revealed several ways that they can be used to 
increase performance in organizations. One proposals to address communication overload has 
been to increase the cost of email, which would reduce collaborative efficiency and encourage 
individuals to only share information that is extremely important (Newport, 2016; “To Make Email 
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Easier We Must Make it Harder - Study Hacks - Cal Newport,” n.d.). Another way that 
communication costs might be harnessed is through the geographic costs associated with 
physical distance. Managers might physically position research divisions at geographically distant 
regions to make it more costly in terms of time and effort for individuals to communicate, while still 
allowing these ties to exist (Benner & Tushman, 2003; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). Additionally, 
corporate trends toward creating virtual teams that are geographically dispersed, which has 
traditionally been seen as a problem, may actually have the benefit of increasing the costs of 
collaboration and thus lowering collaborative efficiency (Maznevski & Chudoba, 2000). Finally, 
organizations might use desk and office layouts to structure more effective collaborate 
environments so that it would be more difficult for some individuals to communicate, using 
physical distance as a cost on tie maintenance (Malone, 1983).  
 Insights into temporal networks could be used by organizations to decrease collaborative 
efficiency and thus increase collective innovation. Managers often face an important dilemma in 
structuring meetings. Should teams of engineers meet early and discuss initial solutions to their 
problems, or should they schedule meetings later after each individual has had a chance to 
explore the problem independently? Initial brainstorming sessions might lead to early 
convergence on suboptimal solutions, whereas delaying collaboration might result in wider 
individual search. Research on groupthink, production blocking, and the common knowledge 
effect has indicated that slowing down collaboration in problem-solving groups might prevent a 
premature consensus on a suboptimal solution (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987, 1991; Janis, 1972, 1982). 
Additionally, corporate boards need to make incredibly complex decisions about an organization’s 
future, and reducing the frequency of board meetings can have a strong effect on increasing firm 
value (Vafeas, 1999). Finally, increasing research has focused on the declines in job satisfaction 
that result from numerous meetings (Rogelberg, Leach, Warr, & Burnfield, 2006). If such research 
is incorporated into management decisions, it could have the effect of reducing the frequency of 
meetings, which could slow down collaboration, and thus increase collective performance on 
complex problems. 
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Discussion 
 Experimental and theoretical results confirm the central idea that network slowness 
increases collective performance by increasing a group’s solution diversity. Simulations on 
varying the group’s initial diversity show a clear increase in performance to having more diversity 
because such groups will be more likely to avoid settling on premature suboptimal solutions, and 
they will be more likely to search a wider portion of the solution space. Groups that were more 
diverse were able to find better average solutions and better top solutions. 
Diversity is frequently recommended as an important method for building competitive and creative 
teams (Page, 2007), so the results of this study have a familiar resonance. However, the 
mechanism as to why diversity is important here is different. In Hong and Page (Hong & Page, 
2004), diversity is useful because different problem-solving approaches can allow groups to 
remain robust to different problems. In this study, diversity has a temporal element, where 
premature convergence of the group onto a small subset of solutions prevents them from 
searching more widely in the solution space. 
 While the experimental control in this study allowed us to test the effects of network 
structure on how groups solve a complex problem, we had to restrict our study to a single 
problem in statistics, namely variable selection in a complex regression. There might be elements 
of this problem that do not generalize to other complex problems. For example, our interface gave 
individuals suggestive variables that might improve their model if they decided to explore. This 
feature captures some elements of real-world problem solving where experts have an indication 
about which way to improve next. However, many complex problems are highly uncertain and 
individuals may have no prior information about which direction would be best to explore. The 
problem was chosen in part because its structure (i.e., a high-dimensional optimization problem 
with high levels of interdependency) matches many real-world problems in science, technology, 
and design (Kauffman et al., 2000; Kauffman & Macready, 1995). In order to ensure the 
generalizability of these findings, it may be important to test these results in other problem 
domains. 
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 A central assumption of this project was that individuals were working in parallel, which 
means that each individual was maximizing their own private utility function by submitting a 
solution, receiving feedback from the environment, and deciding to collaborate with others. There 
are many collective problems where individuals are not working in parallel, but rather in tandem. 
Examples include engineering problems where each individual works on a separate aspect of the 
problem, or web site design where each team is responsible for a different part of the page. 
Understanding how to structure collaboration for large, distributed teams when there is a 
significant amount of division of labor is an important area for future research. 
 The results in this study reveal the dangers inherent in over-connectedness. While there 
have been many benefits from increasing connectivity historically (Gertner, 2012), the theory 
presented here indicates that efficient networks will improve performance only on simple 
problems. Instead, on the most complex problems that we face, this trend toward increased 
connectivity will harm our performance. Finding ways to break down collaboration, either by 
altering the communication network, making communication more costly, or delaying the time of 
collaboration, may increase the performance of teams in engineering, design, business, and 
research. 
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